OVER THE PAST two years, Indonesia has witnessed the implementation of an extraordinary government policy that is all the more unusual because it has aroused little attention on the part of political analysts. In accordance with a 1978 decision of the People's Consultative Assembly (nominally the highest political body under the present Indonesian constitution), a series of workshops or upgrading courses have been organized throughout the archipelago. Under this program all civil servants below the rank of cabinet minister are required to attend two-week upgrading courses whose sole preoccupation is Pancasila, the Indonesian state ideology. More recently other groups of citizens have found it advisable or prudent to organize their own Pancasila courses, and the government has made it known that it intends to extend the courses to “diverse functional and political groups of the society.”

What is remarkable about these courses is first and foremost the sheer cost involved. Called P4 courses (a contraction of the full Indonesian name, which can be translated as Upgrading Course on the Directives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila), these two-week seminars have been noticeably disruptive to the normal flow of government business. The courses first involved the most senior of civil servants. At one point in the past year it seemed as if virtually all government business in Jakarta came to a standstill. Because of P4, key figures were often absent from their offices and unable to make required decisions. Where more than one ministry or department was involved,
delays were compounded. In terms of simply carrying out normal duties, then, P4 has been a costly policy to implement. In addition, there are the direct costs involved in providing teachers, seminar rooms, materials, and amenities such as accommodations or meals for up to two million civil servants and their instructors during the time that they are required to attend the course.

If the costs were not enough to convince one of the seriousness with which the government views P4, the manner of conducting the courses offers further evidence that this is not viewed as a trivial endeavor. Attendance at all sessions is absolutely compulsory. If a civil servant misses one day of the upgrading course, he is required to repeat the entire course from the beginning. No excuses, not even illness or a death in the family, are acceptable dispensations from the requirement of attendance at every session. Classes generally begin at 8 A.M. and continue through the day until 6 P.M., and participants are penalized for tardiness. They are given assignments to complete in the evening and are graded on their performance. A final test is also given, and marks are awarded for overall performance. These marks are recorded in a civil servant's personal dossier and are felt to be important in the consideration for promotion.

In a nation where civil servants are not noted for their diligence or eagerness to work beyond normal office hours, such stringent enforcement of a course of study must stand out as unique in the history of Indonesia. Surely it is difficult to cite another instance of a government program that has been implemented with such uncompromising efficiency and determination. Apparently no exceptions to the P4 policies are tolerated, and even students going abroad for study are often required to complete P4 courses before being given exit visas.

All the evidence suggests that the New Order government sees P4 as providing an important ideological justification for its policies, and that it wishes the claims and prescriptions of P4 to be examined with some care. Certainly the costs involved, both direct and indirect, as well as the manner of implementation of the P4 courses indicates that this is a program strongly supported by the government at the highest levels. An examination of those responsible for drafting the P4 materials and implementing the program confirms this view. They include such senior political figures as the Coordinating Minister for Economics, Finance and Industrial Affairs, Widjojo; Coordinating Minister for State Security, Panggabean; and State Minister for Administrative Reform, Sumarlin. The key figure in articulating the P4 doctrine is Dr. H. Roeslan Abdulgani, formerly Minister of Information and Foreign Affairs under Sukarno, and one time Ambassador to the United Nations under the New Order. Interestingly, it was Roeslan Abdulgani who played a key role in the only experiment similar to P4 that Indonesia has witnessed, Manipol-USDEK.

The purpose of this article is to attempt to examine P4 and its implications for Indonesia's development strategy, the government's po-
litical thinking about its present situation, and its future plans. The article begins with an examination of Pancasila as a political ideology—or with the version of Pancasila that has the official approval of the present regime and is given in the P4 upgrading course. This is briefly contrasted with the understanding of Pancasila propagated under the Guided Democracy of Sukarno. Next, the implications of this ideology for the development strategy of the government are examined. Finally, consideration is given to P4 as part of the government's political strategy, especially with regard to the forthcoming general election in 1982.

The Five Principles

"Pancasila" consists of five principles, succinctly stated in Indonesian but often rather ambiguous when subjected to close analysis and certainly less suggestive when translated into English. The first principle (or sila) is a belief in one supreme being (Sila Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa). Thus the Indonesian state is not secular in the Western sense. However, the belief in a supreme being is left as a general statement, broad enough to encompass a wide variety of religions including Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism—those "great" religions officially recognized by the state and dealt with by the Department of Religion. This Sila is the source of considerable controversy. More orthodox Muslims have frequently favored an explicit commitment to Islam as the state religion and have felt some dissatisfaction at the general phrasing of this Sila. They have also resisted what they see as an attempt on the part of the government to equate mere belief or faith (kepercayaan) with a true religion (agama). This objection is aimed at many of the traditional and pre-Islamic beliefs of the Javanese, which are seen as corruptions or denials of the true faith of Islam. This includes both the animistic beliefs of the rural population as well as the more sophisticated version (kebathinan) of the aristocratic priyayi class.

The second principle is variously described as a commitment either to internationalism or more literally to a just and civilized humanitarianism (Sila Kemanusian yang Adil dan Beradab). The two interpretations are not as divergent as they might seem at first. A commitment to just and civilized humanitarianism entails a willingness to treat with others, even foreigners, in a fair manner, free from suspicion, exploitation, and oppression. When viewed from the perspective of state relations, this becomes a commitment to internationalism in the sense that it rejects adherence to one of two (or more) opposing political blocs or support for an international order which is exploitative and divisive.

The third Sila expresses a commitment to the unity of Indonesia (Sila Persatuan Indonesia). In a vast archipelago stretching 5,000 kilometers across the sea, with 13,000 islands and about 350 distinct ethnic groups, an emphasis on the unity of the state is understandable. The attempts of the Dutch to create semi-autonomous states during the 1947–
1950 period, and subsequent intermittent regional rebellions since that
time, underline the extent to which this Sila, too, has been a point of
some controversy in the past.

The fourth Sila emphasizes the idea of a people led or governed by
wise policies arrived at through a process of consultation and consensus
(Sila Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam
Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan). It would be a great mistake simply to
translate this as a commitment to Western liberal democracy, especially
since the rejection of Western liberalism (or at least some parts of it)
has been a continuing theme of Indonesian political discourse since be-
fore the birth of the nation.2 The word musyawarah is one connoting
discussion and deliberation amongst members of a society, but it does
not suggest such ideas as majority rule and minority rights.3

The fifth Sila expresses a commitment to social justice for all the
Indonesian people (Sila Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia).
This is generally regarded as a relatively unexceptional principle, al-
though it can be asked to what extent the implicit commitment to
equity has an important place in the understanding of Pancasila.

Pancasila as a Political Ideology

There are several interesting features of Pancasila as an ideology,
particularly as it is presented within the P4 courses. In this section, the
character of Pancasila as an ideology will be discussed, with a view in
later sections to showing how certain government policies are legit-
imized by the interpretation of Pancasila given in P4. In later sections,
as well, it will be suggested that some of the inherent contradictions in
Pancasila as an ideology are also reflected in contradictions in the gov-
ernment's development policies.

One important characteristic of Pancasila is its orientation toward
time and its assessment of the significance of the past. The material
produced by the government in connection with P4 stresses the extent
to which Pancasila is to be seen as an articulation of the historical ex-
perience of the Indonesian people.4 According to this interpretation,
Pancasila becomes the formulation of a traditional philosophy of life
rather than the imposition of an alien doctrine. In this sense, P4 claims
to draw out what is already immanent within Indonesian society rather
than indoctrinating the people, and the charge that P4 constitutes state
indoctrination is rejected.5 Nonetheless, P4 provides a formulation

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2 Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking: 1945–1965
3 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia
4 Team Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan-bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik In-
donesia, Bahan Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, Buku I
(Jakarta, no date), pp. 2–5 (hereafter cited as Bahan Penataran).
5 Bahan Penataran, Buku I, 2.
(rumusan) in the sense of an authoritative account of Pancasila and not a mere interpretation (tafsir) of it.\(^6\)

However, Pancasila is not merely a crystallization of past experience and an expression of present perceptions. It is also an aspiration for the future. Part of the justification for P4 lies in the claim that a correct understanding of Pancasila is required for the future development of the nation. It provides the criteria by which the value of policies are to be judged by providing a traditional vision of the good society that is to be achieved.\(^7\)

By embracing the past, present, and future, Pancasila becomes the basis for all legitimate political activity. Indeed, P4 is at pains to point out that the 1945 Constitution, providing the framework for the present political system, is in harmony with Pancasila and can be understood as an expression of the five principles.\(^8\) Similarly, the established Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara) are defended in terms of the extent to which they further the goals enshrined in the state ideology.\(^9\) By achieving a status of articulating both the historical essence and the future aspirations of the Indonesian nation, and also of determining the framework for all acceptable political action, P4 emerges as an important basis for the government's development strategy.

Despite the overarching character of Pancasila, spanning past, present, and future, another striking characteristic of the ideology (at least as expressed in P4) is its lack of specificity. Each of the five principles is on the surface a statement long on rhetoric and sentiment but short on specific prescriptions. Yet prescriptions are precisely the business of political ideologies. They are invoked not simply to express vague hopes, but also to map out policies and chart the directions in which a society should move. Ideologies also serve to locate its adherents in time, giving them a sense of how they should relate to a world of dynamic social forces and change.

In Pancasila, however, fundamental social change and historical development are singularly absent, and P4 presents an extraordinarily static ideology. Ironically, despite its invocation of the past and hopes for the future, P4 seems to rob Pancasila of all sense of historical dynamism. For example, there is no account of the past as the triumph of reason over superstition, as in the Enlightenment and in the political thinking of men such as Montesquieu at that time. There is no rejection of the past as a record of oppression and exploitation, as in Marx. Instead, the past is invoked only in the most general form and never with a sense of change or development.

Similarly, the vision of the future propounded by P4 is also imprecise and vague, with little by way of prescription. The good society en-

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\(^7\) Bahan Penataran, Buku I, pp. iii-v.
\(^8\) Bahan Penataran, Buku II, pp. 53ff.
\(^9\) Bahan Penataran, Buku III.
visioned by P4 can as easily accommodate hierarchy as equality, and private ownership of the means of production as collective ownership. Abrupt revolutionary upheaval, incremental change, or no change at all are all consistent with the five principles.

Pancasila and Sukarno's Guided Democracy

To gain a clearer appreciation of the character of the state ideology as it is now propagated by the New Order government, it is instructive to contrast P4 with Sukarno's attempt to instill a similar ideological commitment in the Indonesian nation during the Guided Democracy period. In his Independence Day speech of 1959, Sukarno articulated five principles later designated as the Political Manifesto of the Indonesian nation. Together with the five principles of Pancasila, these constituted the ideological basis of the regime.

The five principles of the Manifesto Politik included a return to the 1945 Constitution as the most appropriate constitution for Indonesia; socialism à la Indonesia; guided democracy; guided economy; and Indonesian national identity. These principles were held to be in harmony with Pancasila, and indeed their implementation was asserted to be the means of achieving the just and humane society envisioned by Pancasila. Guided democracy was particularly defended as necessary to the realization of the aspirations of Pancasila.  

As with P4, there were strenuous efforts to ensure that the ideology was studied and examined by the civil service. "Retooling" of the government apparatus was the phrase used to refer to the instillation of ideologically correct views and behavior. However, the Manipol-USDEK courses stretched beyond the civil service to embrace primary and secondary school students as well as university students. The press was a particular object of attention, with cultural activities being seen as instruments for furthering the realization of the ideological aspirations of the regime.

In common with P4, there is in Sukarno's formulation the same emphasis on the moral aspects of the ideology. It is not enough merely to understand the precepts of Pancasila and Manipol-USDEK. These must become a fundamental part of the soul and spirit of the Indonesian people. "Inner changes . . . will automatically bring about changes and improvements as regards physical and material affairs."  

In contrast with P4, however, there is in Sukarno's discussions of Manipol-USDEK a strong sense of the dynamism of history and social change. While making references to Indonesian traditions, and claim-

ing to be in harmony with the ancient (almost primordial) Indonesian national spirit, Sukarno also stressed the concept of revolution. In his 1959 and 1960 Independence Day speeches, Sukarno urged the Indonesian nation to abandon the past, meaning specifically the period of 1949-1959. Throughout his speeches of this period there was an emphasis on what Sukarno refers to as the “Romanticism of Revolution” and the need for fundamental change, which he saw in terms of a continuing struggle against the forces of colonialism and imperialism. There were frequent references to the historical experiences of other nations such as France, China, and the United States, which gave an air of cosmopolitanism and international significance to the Indonesian national revolution.

Despite these significant differences, which gave Manipol-USDEK and Sukarno’s interpretation of Pancasila a sense of movement and historical destiny that is entirely absent from P4, both Sukarno and the New Order government used Pancasila to attack or contain rival political ideologies. As Feith remarks with regard to Manipol-USDEK, it was “not an attempt to synthesize all the main patterns of political orientation in Indonesia, for it contains virtually no element of the political outlook characteristic of Islam. It is doubtful whether any state ideology could bridge the gap between the Javanese-aristocratic pole of political orientations and the Islamic-entrepreneurial pole, but certainly Manipol-USDEK does not.”

There may be some question about Feith’s linking the Islamic political movement with an entrepreneurial orientation, but there is no doubt that the efforts to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state were a specific target of attack for Sukarno. Since the first articulation of the five principles, there has been a fundamental tension between Pancasila and Islam. The doctrine was specifically put forward by Sukarno in 1945 in opposition to the demand that the independent Indonesian Republic be an Islamic State, and he continued to use it in the same way during the period of Guided Democracy. As will be discussed below, the New Order government has maintained this traditional use of Pancasila in P4 and in the period leading up to the 1982 elections. In particular, the first Sila has been employed both to exclude an Islamic state and to include traditional Javanese mystical beliefs. By doing so, Pancasila has been aligned with the abangan or syncretic Javanese tradition in opposition to the santri or more orthodox Islamic one.

16 Cf. Sukarno, *Tjamkan Pantja Sila!*
P4 and Development Strategies of the New Order Government

An explicit and major rationale for P4 is the need to explain the third Five-Year Plan (Repelita III), which officially began in 1978 and is to run to 1983. The decision of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which established the legal authority for P4, stressed the need for all civil servants to undergo P4 so that they can better understand the various programs with which they are involved and so that they will become motivated to implement and administer those programs with greater commitment and enthusiasm. Thus the first two volumes of the P4 material produced by the government discuss first Pancasila and second the 1945 Constitution, while the third volume (the longest) turns its attention to an examination of the Broad Outlines of State Policy. In this final volume, P4 attempts to clarify the government’s objectives and policies and to show how they can be understood (and legitimized) within the context of Pancasila. It is precisely at this level that the intellectual dissatisfactions with the static and vague character of Pancasila as an ideology also suggest difficulties for the development strategy of the New Order government.

A key word in Repelita III is “pemerataan,” which literally means making flat or equalizing. It is used to highlight a professed concern with equity and with ensuring that the benefits of development do not simply accrue to privileged groups. The P4 materials, especially in the third volume, are designed to provide the ideological justification for this goal and an explanation of the government’s strategy to achieve it. However, what emerges is little of either. There is discussion of the “trilogy of development” (trilogi pembangunan), which includes spreading the benefits of development, increasing economic growth, and securing national stability. Similarly, there is considerable discussion of the “eight paths of equalization” (delapan jalur pemerataan), but this consists of little more than the presentation of a list of possible areas with which any government program might concern itself. These include basic needs (food, clothing, housing); educational opportunities and health services; income and employment; entrepreneurial opportunities for women and youth; justice; and geographic distribution. Nothing is said that either suggests specific policies or indicates strategies for realizing these general aspirations. Not only is one tempted to see in such formulations an echo of Indonesia’s eclectic past (the eight paths of truth in Buddhism for example), but there is also the traditional emphasis on formulae that both encapsulate knowledge and are the key to changes—especially moral changes in the social order. Such

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19 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 21–22.
20 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 81ff.
formulations, however, evoke a picture of the good society rather than articulating strategies for its achievement.

The closest one gets to an articulation of a more prescriptive and specific ideological position with regard to economics is the statement that the correct path is one lying somewhere between capitalism and socialism. Such a path is one that stresses the interests of the whole society over those of any individual, but at the same time avoids a state domination of the economy. In this regard three sectors of the economy must work together, namely the state sector, the private sector, and the cooperative section. However, this economic doctrine does not contemplate fundamental social change. There is no discussion of ways in which the economy and various social relationships might have to be restructured in order to achieve better equity in the development process. The discussion of the government’s economic policies remains at the same level of generality as the discussion of Pancasila, and the same emphasis on order, unity, continuity, and stability as key features remains.

The only additional factor that appears in this part of P4 is reference to the role of the Indonesian military (ABRI) in national development (“ABRI segagai modal dasar pembangunan nasional”). Security as a guiding principle, encompassing ideological security, political stability, economic justice, and social and cultural harmony, is a primary responsibility of ABRI and a basic precondition for development.

An examination of P4, then, leads one to conclude that the New Order government is committed to a concept of national development that envisions no fundamental change in the social order and that this preservation of the existing order is to be guaranteed by the military. Nothing in the political style of the New Order government or the policies it has pursued suggest anything to the contrary. In short, P4 makes explicit the New Order government’s commitment to the “trickle down” strategy of development, “permerataan” not withstanding. Just as the vision of the future projected by Pancasila is an echo of the past, so also the New Order does not contemplate policies that will result in a future social order markedly different from the present, although it hopes that this society will be more prosperous.

In this sense, it might be said that Pancasila, according to the New Order government, is an ideology of containment rather than one of mobilization. That is, it is conceived in such broad and general terms that it can embrace the wide cultural and religious diversities of the Indonesian nation. While it provides an encompassing umbrella of unity, it is not designed to excite mass participation in the development process or galvanize the nation into action. The Pancasila of P4 thus

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22 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 33ff.
23 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, p. 76.
stands in dramatic contrast to the radical communism of Mao during the Great Leap Forward or the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. What Pancasila offers as a political ideology is unity rather than direction.

The capacity to embrace seemingly opposed social currents and political aspirations is seen as a testimony to the strength and validity of the ruler, argues Anderson in his classic essay on power in Javanese culture. In this sense, what is seen in Western eyes as the vagueness and imprecision of Pancasila may be interpreted by the Javanese, at least, as proof of its wisdom. Similarly, Anderson claims that unity is perceived both as a primary political goal and the criterion of a powerful (and hence successful) state. Therefore, in order to blur social cleavages, instead of sharpening them, the Pancasila of P4 emphasizes the unity and cohesion of society. Again, in this respect it stands in sharp contrast to communism, which makes class conflict the cornerstone of its political prescriptions.

There is a fundamental sense in which this strategy that focuses on economic change without social change must fail over the long term. Profound social changes must inevitably come about as economic changes occur. The increase in manufacturing, the rise in the number of children in schools, the continued pressure on land in Java are all examples of the forces that must alter the basic character of Indonesian society one way or another. The attempt to encourage economic productivity on the one hand and to restrain social change on the other cannot succeed. The question is only one of how and when such a policy will fail and what the likely consequences are.

**P4 and Contemporary Indonesian Politics**

President Suharto, who is considered to be the initiating force behind the P4 program, has publicly never given more than a conventional explanation of the purpose of the training courses. Echoing P4 materials, he has stated that the intention is to "understand again, penetrate, realize and implement our ideas concerning the society to which we aspire." Furthermore, there has been no official pronouncement of why the government felt the launching of the Third Five-Year Plan (Repelita III) was an appropriate occasion for such ideological indoctrination, while the previous two Plans were not.

Despite the lack of a clear and authoritative explanation for the timing of P4, Suharto has lost no opportunity to emphasize the close alliance between the New Order regime and the army (ABRI) under the banner of Pancasila. Permissible political activity is that which is consistent with the state ideology. Political movements that are con-

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26 Ibid., pp. 23ff.
trary to Pancasila are viewed as a fundamental threat to the stability and development of the Indonesian state. In his March 27, 1980, address to an ABRI gathering in the central Sumatran city of Pakanbaru, Suharto stated that ABRI cannot stand idle in the face of any threat to Pancasila, now or in the future. ABRI must "choose a partner and friend who fully supports Pancasila" in order to maintain the supremacy of the state ideology.28

This speech was widely interpreted to mean that in the forthcoming general election, ABRI can be expected to continue its strong support for Golkar, the government party that presently dominates the national parliament (DPR). This statement came as a disappointment to many, including some within Golkar, who had hoped that in this election, in contrast to the two previous elections under the New Order, ABRI would remain somewhat aloof from election politics and allow a relatively free rein to the political process. In part, hopes for this neutrality rested upon the recognition that the president is constitutionally authorized to appoint 100 members of the DPR, and about 60% of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which formally selects the president. Therefore the chance of Golkar finding itself in the minority in either house was almost nonexistent. However, while some expressed the view that "it is time for Golkar to grow up" and fight the election without ABRI assistance, Suharto appears to have decided otherwise.

The ABRI’s continued support for Golkar is not surprising, given the close identification of the military with Pancasila and the opposition parties that Golkar faces in the national elections. The PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party) is particularly important in this regard and was seen as a specific target of attack in the Pakanbaru speech. United more by government decree than by common sentiment, the PPP is an amalgam of Islamic political groups required to join together under the government-directed program of simplifying the political system. (The other opposition party is the PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democracy Party.) In reaffirming an alliance between ABRI and Golkar under the banner of Pancasila, therefore, Suharto was giving advance warning that the government intends to keep the activities of Islamic political groups under close control. To this extent Suharto’s use of Pancasila follows in the footsteps of Sukarno.

On the face of it, the government would seem to have little to fear from the two opposition parties. They are firmly in the minority within the present parliament and are ridden by internal divisions and factions. While the national press is somewhat free to offer criticism and political comment, there is no doubt about the government’s ability and willingness to control the flow of information when it decides to. With political activity at a village level banned, neither of the opposition parties has any formal popular organization. Although the in-

28 Quoted in Asia Week, 6:18 (May 9, 1980).
formal network of local religious leaders (kiyayi) probably works to the advantage of the PPP, it is difficult to know the extent to which the kiyayi can effectively mobilize political support at the village level. In any case, few suggest that the New Order should be swept away, and in their adherence to the basic structure of the New Order most of the government's critics form a kind of loyal opposition.

However, the possibility of a resurgence of Islam in the political arena clearly remains a concern of the present regime. Some suggest that events in Iran and the movement toward Islamic legal systems and economic arrangements in the Middle East are a source of continuing concern to the government. However, the parallel between Iran and Indonesia is probably more rhetorical than useful in understanding how the government sees its position. Of more fundamental importance is the continuing importance of Islam at the village level. Despite ABRI support for Golkar, the groups comprising PPP won 27% of the popular vote in the 1971 election, and as a single party this was increased to 29% in 1977. In addition, there are other indications of support for Islamic organizations apart from political parties. For example, although no reliable data is available, it is estimated that somewhere around 20–25% of Indonesia’s school age children currently attend Islamic schools, even though parents incur direct financial costs because Islamic schools receive only marginal assistance from government agencies and must charge tuition fees. In contrast, state schools are supposed to be free. Little is known about the character of this system of religious education and the reasons why parents support these institutions, but it is clear that this must indicate a significant attachment to the values of Islamic education in contrast to the government’s non-Islamic, almost secular, system. Similarly, Islamic institutions have aroused some popular support in vocally opposing the government’s decision not to close schools during the long fasting month of Ramadan (Puasa). In past years, Islamic groups have forced the government to abandon its plans to revise the legal code governing marriage, a move seen as “secular” in intention and diminishing to the status of the religious courts.

In this context, P4 has been seen by Islamic groups as an attempt to indoctrinate the people with a new ideology, contrary to the true faith. This is specifically denied by the government in the P4 materials, which argue that Pancasila is compatible with all religions. However,
this attempt at reassuring Islamic groups somewhat misfires because it is also argued that according to Pancasila only a faith in a Supreme Being is posited as essential. The word "belief" (kepercayaan) has a special significance in that it is generally understood in this context to mean traditional Javanese mystical beliefs, which are strongly resisted by orthodox Muslims who see these as either a corruption of the true faith or (in its manifestation as kebathinan) as an alternative to Islam. While P4 does not seek to establish either Pancasila as the state religion or traditional mystical beliefs as an officially recognized religion, it does seem clear that such traditional beliefs are compatible with the state ideology and Islam can claim no special place. Thus the original tension between Pancasila and Islam is sustained in P4, and the use of the state ideology to contain the political appeal of the santri tradition is continued.

The president's speech in Pakanbaru, along with P4, are two major indications of the government's interest in the use of Pancasila to establish a firm political basis for the New Order. There is also further evidence for this interest. Shortly after P4 was instituted, the president approached the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) to ask for its assistance with the problem of ensuring that Pancasila is understood and accepted at a village level. The request was for a research project aimed at investigating the present values and aspirations of village communities and ways that Pancasila could be more effectively spread among the population. Recent speeches and articles in the national press have stressed the importance of ensuring that the values of the revolutionary generation are passed along to succeeding generations—a familiar issue for post-revolutionary societies and also a concern of P4 itself.

Taken together, such indications suggest that it will be some time before the New Order government is prepared to permit free political activity. The clear and conscious attempt of P4 and other government activities is to provide an accepted framework to contain politics within defined boundaries. Pancasila, as expounded by P4, is the clearest and most self-conscious articulation of this ideological vision and, by implication, of the competing visions that the government is not prepared to tolerate.

Conclusion

It is impossible now to determine to what extent P4 has succeeded in achieving the objectives set by the government. At the end of 1980, Pancasila courses have in general moved from the central government level in Jakarta to provincial level government offices and universities. The process can be expected to continue for about another year, especially if sections of the population outside the civil service either or-

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81 Bahan Penataran, Buku III, pp. 57-58.
ganize Pancasila courses or are required to join P4. Even in the short run, therefore, it is too early to come to firm conclusions about the success or failure of the New Order government's efforts to establish Pancasila as the accepted basis of political order and the justification for development plans.

The above discussion suggests, however, that there are fundamental problems in the formulation of Pancasila by the present regime, and with the way it seeks to propagate its views through P4. While there is little doubt that the regime will prevail through the forthcoming national elections, only time will tell if elements of social change and historical dynamics are infused into its presently static ideology.

What is perhaps most disappointing about P4 is that it reveals the extent to which the New Order regime has failed to project a future that is clearly defined and likely to be realized. Over the past two years there has been discussion of the apparent loss of elan within the government and a growing sense that it has somehow lost both its way and its confidence in its own capabilities. This assessment of the government's concern and uncertainty has been confirmed by its handling of a variety of events from the June 1980 Petition of Fifty, to anti-Chinese riots in central Java in November of that year, to the April 1981 hijacking of a Garuda airliner. The decision to pursue a nationwide program of political indoctrination may be viewed in this light as a symptom of growing insecurity on the part of the present regime and of an attempt to rekindle a sense of its own purpose. If so, the above discussion suggests that this is an effort that must ultimately fail. The failure, if it occurs, may be one of imagination because the New Order government has been unable to develop within the doctrine of Pancasila development strategies capable of addressing the inevitability of profound social change or of generating a new, ideological vision for Indonesia.

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